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RBM and Theories of Change
by Russell Gasser
Editorial
G ive me your money; I’m busy doing things” is not the most convincing fundraising appeal. Instead, “Look at the difference our program has made to 
the lives of the people that were helped” is far more likely to 
get a positive response. The overall purpose of mine action is 
to improve people’s lives and livelihoods, to reduce casualties, 
and increase compliance with political commitments like the 
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC). Although 
this is widely known, standard reporting excessively includes 
information on how many people received risk education, 
how many square meters of land were cleared, or how many 
people attended a training session. In other words, they report 
activities instead of outcomes. This information tells the do-
nor that the mine action organization was busy but does not 
tell donors whether their money made positive, long-term dif-
ferences in beneficiaries’ lives, nor does it help donors under-
stand if the work was good value for money overall. To make 
a difference, implementing organizations need to know what 
success looks like and how to report it correctly. Even more 
important is the need to learn from experience, avoid repeat-
ing errors, and identify good practices and clever solutions for 
future use. Successful mine clearance is not measured by how 
many mines were removed but by the overall impact on the 
beneficiaries, the local communities and nations where they 
live, and how much the organizations involved were able to 
learn and implement continual improvement.
It’s not enough to be busy. Risk education only makes a dif-
ference if as a result people change their everyday behavior. 
Clearing farmland only makes a difference if local people pro-
ductively use the land once cleared. It’s tempting to measure 
time spent, but what really matters are results. This means 
that success can only be measured well after a mine action in-
tervention is completed.
This is not a new issue. Results-based management (RBM) 
started about 50 years ago. In the 1960s and 1970s, when na-
tional governments realized that it was not useful to measure 
social welfare programs by how much money they spent; New 
Public Management began measuring the results instead. 
RBM uses the same ideas and is experiencing a donor-driven 
resurgence. Unless donors continuously insist on using RBM, 
a cycle occurs where RBM is promoted with great enthusiasm 
and then gradually forgotten over the space of several years. 
Once time, money, and effort are spent on programs to ensure 
that RBM is successfully implemented, organizations tend to 
return to business as usual, and the focus on RBM is reduced 
or lost without pressure from donors.1
RBM is a method of ensuring quality management (QM) 
for donor funding. The very widely used International 
Organisation for Standardisation ISO 9001 approach is based 
on QM for customer-supplier relationships. Quality is de-
fined as “making sure that customer expectations are met or 
exceeded.”2 The underlying thinking is that a business with-
out satisfied customers has two choices: improve quality or go 
bankrupt. Going out of business because local beneficiaries 
are unhappy is not often part of the donor-funded approach. 
In donor-supported programs, implementers normally spend 
other people’s money according to an overall plan that the 
field-partner did not write (perhaps a national plan) in order 
to deliver goods or services that will help people whom the do-
nor does not know and will never meet. No single customer- 
supplier relationship exists that can be implemented for over-
all QM or to measure value for money. In other respects, the 
ISO 9001 method and the seven core principles of the 2015 
“
Figure 1. The results-based methods pocket toolkit.
All graphics courtesy of author via resultsbased.org.
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version can be used to improve the quality and value of donor-
funded work through RBM and QM.
One of the new phrases for RBM is theories of change, which 
describes and summarizes how the intervention will bring 
positive changes to people’s lives. It describes why spending 
donor money will lead to activities in the field, and why this 
will improve the lives of local people, whereas the work plan 
outlines how this will happen.
Although there is an argument among academics about the 
exact definition, theories of change for mine action as well as 
weapons management and destruction activities are evidence-
based and have three, widely-accepted core parts:
1. Results chains describe the elements that links in-
puts to results and are often drawn as a set of five 
or six boxes in a row (i.e., a results chain diagram).
2. Causal links represent “if this, then that” cause and 
effect evidence of why change will happen.
3. Assumptions about the context of the intervention 
that are necessary for success.3
All three must be included in a theory of change. A change 
model diagram is not a theory of change by itself.
Historically, planners wrote about the hypothesis of the in-
tervention.4,5,6 Most donor-funded programs are, in essence, 
social science experiments. However, instead of working with 
volunteers (or rats) in a lab, we are spending real donor mon-
ey to achieve behavioral changes in the lives of real people. 
Ideally, if the project delivers the planned activities, then peo-
ple will change their behavior. This is so familiar that plan-
ners and implementers sometimes forget it is an experiment. If 
we deliver risk education, then people will change their high-
risk behavior. If we clear this land, then people will use it to 
grow food. If we train people in planning skills, then a bet-
ter national plan will not only be written but also implement-
ed. Sometimes we make a false assumption that project inputs 
will automatically lead to the desired results. For example, a 
project must actually verify that people change their behavior 
after receiving risk education in order to show that the theory 
of change is correct. Typically, this can only be done long after 
the end of a short-term project, which is often a problem when 
donors want evidence of success immediately. A full year of 
an agricultural planting and harvesting cycle may be needed 
to show that the cleared land was put into productive use. The 
deeply ingrained idea that mine clearance has an impact as 
soon as the land is handed over needs to change. Similarly, do-
nors should understand that the evidence of success they need 
cannot immediately be produced as soon as funding ends.
Training projects that teach planning skills are a good ex-
ample. Considerable time and many different people outside 
of the project may be needed to achieve the desired result, such 
as a well written and adopted national plan. Implementing the 
plan after it’s adopted is even further removed from the ob-
jective of the training. Because someone finishes the initial 
training does not guarantee that they will eventually write a 
plan that is implemented. Maybe the person finds another job 
soon afterward, and the plan is never written. Maybe the plan 
is written but rejected by the government. In these cases, the 
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Figure 2. Mine action results chain diagram.
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Similarly, recording the number of people attending an 
RBM course does not indicate that an organization is fol-
lowing an RBM approach. Success occurs when the orga-
nization yields behavior change by using RBM (outcome). 
As a result, the organization is transformed into a more ef-
ficient, responsive system that learns and improves (long-
term impact).
Result level names Intended changes Indicator difficulty
Impact or Strategic Objective Changes to beneficiaries, lives at a
community or society level
Hard.
Long delays.
Often very indirect information.
External factors very important.




Change in behavior by people
influenced indirectly
Moderate to hard.
Can be indirect or very indirect.
Delay after activities end.
External factors will be important (attribution issues).
May include qualitative and hard to analyze.
Important for determining success.
Immediate Outcome Change in behavior by people




External factors quite important.
Often quantitative or pseudo-quantitative.
Important for determining success.
Output Anything we make or buy Easy or moderate.
Needs to be designed into activities.
Equivalent to Kirkpatrick level 2 evaluation.
Activity What we do Directly available from project management
information - in well organized activities,
minimal effort needed.
Does not indicate success.
Inputs Quantity of resources used Standard accountancy and audit.
Table 1. Key indicators in mine action.
Actual projects are never simple and are often unable to 
deliver exactly what was intended in the planning phase. To 
account for this, we identify the key assumptions on which 
the planning logic depends. These external assumptions are 
issues that are beyond the control of the project. Typical as-
sumptions include a stable political situation, the cessation 





























































Table 2. Difficulty of collecting data for mine action indicators.
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salaries, and computers for planning staff by the national au-
thorities so that staff do not seek other jobs. The availability of 
the necessary tools and supplies to start food production on 
cleared land is another common assumption.
Some RBM specialists argue that knowing how to measure 
the success of a result should be the starting point of any plan-
ning process. Unless everyone involved from donors to benefi-
ciaries can agree on the definition of success, and the project 
has the means to recognize long-term success, there is a risk 
that the intervention will accidentally support failure. Unless 
success is clearly understood, defined, and measured, it can-
not be properly separated from failure. Being busy is not a 
measure of success. Before starting field work and even be-
fore making detailed plans, project participants and funders 
need to define success and measure the situation. Before and 
after measurements are essential in order to illustrate that the 
project has made a difference. A single measurement at the 
end of a project cannot show that there has been a change. 
If the benefits cannot be identified or if the project does not 
include the necessary resources to analyze the benefits after 
activities have ended, it is not possible to justify claims of suc-
cess. Hard work and optimism for good results is not a strat-
egy. Positive changes have to be attributable to the activities 
that were funded, not just a fortunate coincidence.
Measuring the inputs to a project, the activities complet-
ed, and the resulting outputs is a matter of administering, ac-
counting, and auditing, and should be straightforward in a 
well-run organization. In contrast, measuring outcomes (be-
havior changes in other people) and impacts (long-term soci-
etal level changes) cannot be done directly and requires the 
use of indicators to demonstrate what is happening. The pur-
pose of indicators is to understand why the project developed 
as it did, to improve upon the project, learn from the experi-
ence, and report the project’s results. John Mayne, a leading 
RBM specialist, wrote “the aim of measurement is to acquire 
some insight and develop some comfort that the program is 
actually having an impact.”7 Understanding and improve-
ment is the main goal, not justifying activities to a donor. 
Identifying the difference that was made to the lives of ben-
eficiaries and the value for money that donors can expect is es-
sential; planning begins by first defining success. Donors 
increasingly expect this information and will prefer to fund 
implementers who include it. However, the biggest advantage 
of RBM is learning how to work better, how to avoid or solve 
problems, and how to learn and reuse solutions and skills. 
See endnotes page 66
Further information about the results chain 
diagram, theories of change, and indicators can be 
found on the author’s website: resultsbased.org.
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